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Abstract—In this work, we propose LUT-Lock, a novel Look-
Up-Table-based netlist obfuscation algorithm, for protecting
the intellectual property that is mapped to an FPGA bitstream
or an ASIC netlist. We, first, illustrate the effectiveness of
several key features that make the LUT-based obfuscation
more resilient against SAT attacks and then we embed the
proposed key features into our proposed LUT-Lock algorithm.
We illustrates that LUT-Lock maximizes the resiliency of the
LUT-based obfuscation against SAT attacks by forcing a near
exponential increase in the execution time of a SAT solver with
respect to the number of obfuscated gates. Hence, by adopting
LUT-Lock algorithm, SAT attack execution time could be made
unreasonably long by increasing the number of utilized LUTs.
Keywords-SAT attack; obfuscation; hardware security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardware security has become a major concern for both
FPGA and ASIC solutions. For the ASIC solution, the
problem of hardware security resides in using untrusted
parties in the manufacturing supply chain for economically
driven reasons. Due to the high cost of building, operating,
managing, and maintaining state-of-the-art silicon manu-
facturing facilities, many major U.S. high-tech companies
have been always fabless or went fabless in recent years
[2], which has led them to adopt to offshore fabrication.
However, many offshore fabrication facilities are considered
to be untrusted, and fabrication in untrusted fabs has in-
troduced multiple forms of security threats into the supply
chain including threats of overproduction, Trojan insertion,
Reverse Engineering , IP theft, and counterfeiting [2].
On the other hand, FPGAs are inherently more secure
for their post-silicon reconfigurability. However, the FPGA
hardware security relies on protected and non-intruded map-
ping of the intended bitstream into FPGAs. In certain cases,
it is difficult to protect the bitstream both during the initial
configuration in untrusted third-party systems as well as
during remote and in-field reconfiguration [3]. A successful
attack may result in an unauthorized transfer of a bitstream
to a third-party, reverse-engineering of the embedded netlist,
injection of a hardware Trojan, and cloning or theft of
embedded IPs [3][4]. Although high-end FPGAs are typ-
ically equipped with bitstream encryption, there are many
cases where encryption alone is not enough [4]: (1) Not
all FPGA families are equipped with implementations of
cryptographic algorithms [5], [6], especially for small and
low-energy FPGAs. (2) When the power and delay overhead
of bitstream encryption process is not tolerable, a developer
may choose not using encryption. (3) Many FPGA-based
products, to support new services or to enhance the existing
ones, require frequent updates which mostly accomplished
remotely. Despite the first time safely programming, for in-
field updates and a remote upgrade, the encrypted bitstream
and the keys are vulnerable to leakage [3]. (4) After de-
ployment, FPGAs are susceptible to physical attacks. The
long-term in-field usage makes it possible for an attacker to
extract the encryption keys via various side channel attack
mechanisms [7]. So, it is essential to implement additional
defensive measures to prevent the usability of a leaked
bitstream. Such threats validates the need for implementing
a strong obfuscation to hide the bitstream.
In this paper we propose LUT-Lock, which obfuscates
a netlist while embedding several key features that make
the obfuscation a hard problem for state of the art attacks
with particular attention to Satisfiability (SAT) Attacks. To
develop this defense mechanism, we have identified several
key features that increase the difficulty of obfuscation for
SAT attacks. We illustrate how by utilizing each feature dur-
ing the obfuscation, the SAT problem becomes harder. We
propose LUT-Lock algorithm which combines all features,
providing the best defense against SAT attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides background on the logic obfuscation, and the use of
SAT solvers for deobfuscation. Section III justifies the use of
LUTs for obfuscating ASIC and FPGA solutions. Section IV
explains various LUT-based obfuscation sub-algorithms pro-
posed in LUT-Lock and justifies their effectiveness. Section
V describes our experimental setup. Section VI presents our
experimental results and discusses our findings. And finally,
section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Obfuscation
Logic obfuscation is the process of hiding the function-
ality of a synthesized IP by building ambiguity by means
of control and programmability into its netlist. Gate camou-
flaging and logic locking are two of the widely explored ob-
fuscation schemes in ASICs [8][9][10]. The claim raised by
such obfuscation scheme was that to break the obfuscation,
the adversaries need to try a large number of inputs and key
combinations to extract the correct key, whose time increases
exponentially as the number of keys and inputs increases.
Note that in ASIC solutions, the availability of scan chains
(for DFT), allows an adversary to access combinational logic
in each stage of a sequential circuit.
The strength of logic obfuscation was seriously challenged
by attacks formulated using satisfiability solvers (SAT At-
tacks), which were able to break the prior methods of logic
obfuscation within minutes [11][12]. The strength of this
attack directed the attention of HW security researchers to
architect harder obfuscation schemes that are more resilient
to SAT attacks. SARLock [13], Anti-SAT [14], And-Tree-
Insertion (ATI) [15], CamoPerturb [16], SFLL-HD0 [17],
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
11
27
5v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
0 M
ay
 20
18
and SRCLock [18] are some of the obfuscation approaches
that were proposed for this purpose. However further re-
search proved that some of these obfuscation techniques are
prone to other types of attacks such as simple removal attack
after identification of these blocks using Signal Probability
Skew (SPS) attacks [19], and approximate-SAT attacks.
LUT-based obfuscation has been previously visited by
few researchers. The work in [23] suggest using LUTs for
obfuscation and provides several replacement strategies to
secure a netlist. However, the proposed mapping algorithms
are not resilient against SAT attacks, and are only evaluated
in terms of power, performance and area (PPA) overhead,
while the claim on the security of these schemes is made
solely base on inability to readout the content of LUTs
after reverse engineering. The work in [22] proposed a STT-
LUT-based obfuscation with three different LUT placement
algorithms. This work further focuses on PPA impact of their
solution and illustrates that utilizing STT-based LUTs could
reduce the PPA impact. However, the proposed solution does
not consider its resiliency against SAT attack.
B. SAT Attack
Every obfuscated gate in a netlist could be represented by
a Key Programmable Gate (KPG). A KPG, based on its key
input, could be configured to take any of n different possible
functionalities. In XOR and MUX based obfuscation, the
XOR and MUX are already a key programmable cell, where
the key input to an XOR gate or select input of a MUX
are considered as key inputs. Other obfuscated gates could
be easily transformed into a key programmable cell. For
example, a camouflaged gate could be represented by a
MUX, with each possible output column of a truth table
taken as an input to the MUX and the select inputs of a MUX
used as key inputs. In SAT attack, the obfuscated netlist is
first updated by converting all obfuscated cell to KPG cells.
Let us refer to this circuit by a Key Programmable Circuit
(KPC). A SAT attack on an obfuscated circuit is an iterative
process of finding an input and two key values K1 and K2
for which a KPC produces two different results, where one
of them is the expected output, that could be verified by
comparing it to the output of a functional circuit (eval). Such
input is denoted as a Discriminating Input (DIP). The SAT
solver then formulates an additional constraint that in the
future iterations such that in addition to producing a different
output for a new input, the two keys (K1 and K2) should
also produce the same output for all previously found DIPs.
This constraint makes sure that solver reduces the set of
possible keys for a circuit in each iteration. The SAT solver
exits when it can no longer find a new DIP. At this point,
any key that produces the correct output for all previously
found DIPs is the correct key [11][12].
III. LUT-BASED OBFUSCATION FOR ASIC AND FPGA
A. LUT-based obfuscation in FPGA
In an FPGA solutions the hardware resources are are
fixed and is designed independent of a given netlist. Hence
by nature, state of the art FPGAs provide a large pool of
resources to be applicable to a wide range of applications,
resulting in a large number of non-utilized LUTs after
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Figure 1: (a) sample circuit (b) using configurable switches + PUFs
(NLFSRs) for employing larger LUTs after synthesis.
mapping a netlist to the FPGA. For instance, the study
in [3] depicts the utilization of Altera Cyclone V after
mapping a diverse set of benchmarks of various scale and
complexity to this FPGA, and reported that FPGA utilization
is typically low. This phenomenon was coined as FPGA-
Dark-Silicon [3]. These unmapped and unutilized LUTs are
freely available and could be used for obfuscating a to-be-
mapped netlist. Hence, LUT-based obfuscation in FPGAs
could be considered as utilizing unused LUTs, or using
larger than needed LUTs, where the connectivity and impact
of additional logic is controlled using keys. The process of
using LUTs in FPGA for the purpose of logic obfuscation
is illustrated in in Fig. 1(b), where some of 2-input (or 3-
input) logic gates could be mapped to a LUT of larger size
(e.g. size 4 or 5). Then, the additional inputs can be taken
from the output of an internally implemented Non-Linear
Feedback Shift Register (NLFSR) or a Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) [20]. In addition, by changing the ordering
of inputs based on the key inputs (generated by PUF), the
obfuscated circuit possibilities increases. Lets assume a PUF
is used. In this case, each FPGA has a unique PUF response.
By knowing the PUF response ahead of time, the bitstream
will load the LUTs with proper values and will transmit
the directives for connecting the known PUF outputs to the
proper LUT inputs and switch box select lines. However, the
PUF values will not be transmitted in the bitstream. This
missing key values serve as the obfuscation key in LUT
based obfuscation. Also note that the bitstream in this case
is unique for each FPGA, as each FPGA has a unique PUF
response. In this case, even if the bitstream is leaked, the
PUF response remains unknown, making the problem similar
to ASIC flow, where after reverse engineering the obfuscated
netlist is available, but the keys are unknown.
B. LUT-based obfuscation in ASIC
In ASICs, utilizing LUTs for obfuscation can lead to
the considerable area and delay overhead. In the CMOS
implementation of LUTs, the area overhead of the memory
elements in a LUT exponentially increases as a function of
its input size. Hence, the imposed area overhead limits the
number of LUTs that could replace regular gates in a netlist.
In addition, the performance/delay requirements constrain
the placement of LUTs in timing critical and near timing
critical paths. However, with the introduction of STT and
MTJ based LUTs [21][22] and the promise of integration
of STT and MTJ/pMTJ-based LUTs into the same CMOS
process, the area overhead of LUTs is expected to sharply
reduce. Integration of CMOS and MTJ/STT devices makes
it possible for a larger number of LUTs to be implemented
given a fixed area overhead. Using LUTs for obfuscation
in ASICs is straightforward: selected cells are removed
and replaced by LUTs. The functionality of cell remains
hidden to the manufacturer. LUTs are then programmed after
fabrication in a trusted testing facility.
IV. PROPOSED LUT-LOCK OBFUSCATION ALGORITHM
Our proposed LUT-Lock algorithm combines several key
features, each enhancing its ability to resist against SAT
attacks. In this section, we first explain each key feature,
and then propose the LUT-Lock algorithm that combines
all features into a comprehensive solution. In the result
section of this paper, we illustrate how by adding each
key feature, the resiliency of obfuscated netlist against SAT
attack increases, proving that the resiliency gained from
adding this features are orthogonal to one another.
A. FIC: Focusing on the Fan-In Cone of minimum number
of primary output
The first criteria for selection of candidate gates is de-
rived from the observation that higher output corruption
reduces resiliency of obfuscation solution against SAT at-
tacks [13][14]. Hence, by mapping the LUTs such that it
affects the minimum number of primary outputs (POs), the
degree of output corruption reduces, increasing the strength
of obfuscation against SAT attacks. To achieve this, we limit
the LUT insertion to the fan-in cone of smallest possible set
of primary outputs (best case being single output), and we
refer this algorithm as FIC. Note that FIC LUT-replacement
still corrupts other outputs, as the intersection of fan-in cones
of different outputs is not empty. In addition, the number
of gates in the intersection of fan-in cones increases as we
move from outputs toward inputs. Hence the obfuscation
should be designed to replace the closest cells to the selected
output first. This could be achieved by means of a Breadth
First Search (BFS). In order to avoid timing violation due
to replacing a gate with LUT, we estimates the delay of
all timing paths through a gate selected for replacement.
If the estimated delay is more than predefined threshold
(e.g. 10% delay overhead), the allowance of replacement
for this candidate will be revoked, and next candidate will
be checked for replacement. After replacing all gates in the
current Fan-In Cone, a new primary output will be selected.
In FIC algorithm, the output pin(s) selected for obfusca-
tion should meet two conditions: (1) Total Positive Slack
(TPS) of all timing paths leading to that primary output(s)
should be large. This is because replacing a gate with LUT
incurs additional delay in every timing path that passes
through that gate. Hence, we need available timing slack
for replacement of faster logic gates with slower LUTs.
(2) it must have a large fan-in cone size, giving us more
candidate gates for replacement. Fig. 2(a) illustrates the FIC
replacement strategy. Between the two outputs, i.e. g8 and
g9, g9 is not selected, as it contains the largest number of
timing critical paths. When using BFS for gate selection,
FIC selects gates {G8 and G5} or {G8, G5, G2, and G4}
when its asked to replace 2 or 4 gates respectively. For large
circuits, we define two coefficients (α and β) for prioritizing
these two conditions to generate a cumulative weight which
helps selecting the best candidate output. For this purpose,
we normalize the TPS (into TPS*) and FIC (into FIC*) with
respect to their maximum possible values in the given circuit.
Then using α.TPS* + β.FIC*, we obtain the cumulative
weight for the FIC selection process.
B. HSC: Focusing on Higher Skew Gates in FIC
Our investigation on the hardness of many tested LUT
placement strategies revealed that the cells with higher
Signal Probability Skew (SPS) at their output are better
candidates for obfuscation. The SPS at the output of a gate
is defined as |Pr(0) − Pr(1)|, with Pr(1) and Pr(0) being
the probability of having a 1 or 0 at the output of the
gate respectively. The SPS of a gate is a measure of its
controllability using primary inputs. The higher the SPS,
the lower the controllability of the respective gate. Hence,
selecting a high SPS output gate lowers the chances of SAT
solver selecting an input that tests the output of that gate.
With this observation, the second step of our proposed
algorithm is to modify the FIC to perform the gate selec-
tion based on its measure of gate’s output (higher) skew
probability. In this modified FIC algorithm, which is now
referred to as HSC, the gate selection strategy is modified as
follows: within the Fan-In cone of selected output(s) based
on FIC, the replacement priority is given to gates with higher
SPS; In HSC, when a gate is selected for obfuscation, its
fan-in gates will be added to the list of gates that could
be visited in the next search for gate replacement, and the
gates with the highest SPS will be selected among all gates
in the list. Similar to FIC algorithm, each gate replacement
candidate should pass the timing check, otherwise ignored.
HSC replacement flow is illustrated in Fig. 2(b). In the first
invocation of HSC, fan-in cone of gate G8, for satisfying the
FIC requirements, is selected and is obfuscated. For the 2nd
gate selection, HSC has three candidates G2, G5, and G4.
Based on the skew probability of wires, as illustrated in Fig.
2(b), G4 with SPS of 0.5 is selected over G5 and G2 with
SPS of 0.5 and zero respectively. For the 3rd gate selection,
HSC appends the fan-in gates of G4 (Here is primary inputs
and will be ignored!) as candidate gates for replacement
along with G2 and G5. Hence, among these 2 gates, G5 is
selected for having the higher SPS.
C. MFO-HSC: Focusing on gates with Minimum Fan-Out
As mentioned previously, lowering the output corruption
increases the difficulty of the SAT attack [13][14]. Although
we develop FIC in the first step, the probability of having
a fan-in cone with no common gate with other fan-in cones
is close to zero. Separating the fan-in cones of different
outputs could be achieved by replicating common gate,
however this will result in a large area overhead. In order
to limit the primary output corruption without exploding the
area, we introduce another sub-algorithm in which we give
obfuscation priority to candidate gate with lowest fan-out.
We refer to this gate selection strategy as MFO-HSC.
In MFO-HSC algorithm, a BFS search is first deployed
(FIC), visiting all candidate gates at the current breadth, and
gate(s) with a minimum number of fan-outs will be selected.
Whenever a tie between two or more gates is observed,
the gate with the highest SPS is selected. When a gate is
obfuscated, its fan-in gates are added to the list of candidate
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Figure 2: Gate selection process based on various sub-algorithms: (a) FIC: Focusing on Fan-In Cone of minimum number of primary outputs (b) HSC:
Prioritizing higher skew probability gates in FIC (c) MFO-HSC: Prioritizing gates with minimum fan-out & HSC (d) MO-HSC: Prioritizing gates with
minimum impact on outputs & HSC (e) NB2-MO-HSC: Avoiding back-to-back insertion of LUTs & MO-HSC.
gates that will be visited in the next gate selection. Similar
to FIC, each gate replacement candidate should pass the
timing check, otherwise ignored. Fig. 2(c) depicts how the
MFO-HSC works; Similar to FIC, the fan-in cone of g8
is selected for obfuscation and G8 is obfuscated. Based on
BFS, the next candidates are G5, G2, and G4. The gate G2
is selected over G5 and G4 for having fan-out of 1. The fan-
in of G2 is then added to the candidate gates for the next
visit. In this figure, the fan-in of G2 are primary inputs, and
they are ignored, and the the next candidate gate is only G5.
D. MO-HSC: Focusing on Gates with least impact on POs
Based on our observation in MFO-HSC, there are some
gates that have more than one fan-out, but they only affect
one output. For instance, as it can be seen Fig. 2(c), the fan-
out of g4 is 2. However, it affects only g9. This observation
led us to introduce a similar but more efficient sub-algorithm,
which is called MO-HSC. In this sub-algorithm rather than
looking at the fan-out of the candidate gates, we count the
number of outputs that are connected to each candidate
gate. MO-HSC requires additional parsing and processing,
however it further reduces the output corruption as a result
of obfuscation. Similar to MFO-HSC, the tie between two
candidate gates (for affecting an equal number of outputs)
is broken using SPS of respective gates. Each time a gate is
selected for its obfuscation, the fan-in of the gate is added to
the list of candidate gates to be considered for the next gate
selection. Similar to FIC algorithm, each gate replacement
candidate should pass the timing check, otherwise ignored.
MO-HSC is illustrated in Fig. 2(d), where after selecting the
G8 based on FIC selection policy, the gate G2 is selected
over G5 and G4 for impacting smaller number of outputs.
E. NB2-MO-HSC: Avoiding Back-to-Back insertion of LUTs
The back-to-back obfuscation of gates with LUTs suffers
from the increased number of key-possibilities as a result of
the provided freedom in exploiting gate conversion based
on De Morgans’s Laws. For instance, as it can be seen
in Fig. 3, the back-to-back obfuscation of the function
(A∨B)∧(C∨D), using 2-input LUTs, could have 4 different
combinations of programmable logic based on De Morgans’s
Laws. So, the number of correct keys from the intended 1
increases to 4. Each additional gate obfuscated in the fan-in
of this logic cone, creates another set of possibilities after
application of De Morgans’s law, leading to exponential
increase in the number of valid keys, a phenomenon that
we refer to as correct key explosion. Depending on the
growth rate of the set of valid-keys and the number of keys,
obfuscating more gate may even reduce the obfuscation
strength. This is illustrated in Fig. 4 where execution time
of a SAT solver, and a number of generated keys per each
inserted LUT for the benchmark C5315 of ISCAS-85 is
plotted. The LUTs are placed back-to-back, hence, insertion
of each LUT increases the number of keys. The plot focuses
on the insertion of 38th to the 45th LUT. The insertion
of 41st and 42nd LUT, produces a large number of new
keys (around 104) based on De Morgan gate conversion
possibilities. Hence, the SAT solver execution time doesn’t
increase. On the other hand, replacement of gate 40 produces
far less number of new keys (in range of 10s). Hence the
growth of the set of candidate/possible keys exceeds the
growth rate of correct keys, significantly increasing the run-
time of SAT solver. From this key observation, we need to
suppress the growth-rate of correct keys from exploitation of
De Morgan’s gate conversion laws. So, we introduce another
algorithm, NB2-MO-HSC, which implements this restriction
by avoiding back-to-back obfuscated, keeping the set of
correct keys at a minimum. In this gate replacement strategy,
we first select the candidates in FIC using no back-to-
back constraint. Then, the selection among the candidates is
made based on candidate gate’s connectivity to the minimum
number of outputs. If there is a tie among candidates, the
SPS of candidate gates determines the selection. As soon
as a gate is selected, the NB2-MO-HSC searches the fan-
in of the selected gate, skips one logic level (no back to
back), and adds the fan-in of all skipped gates to the set
of candidate gates for the next gate selection. Similar to
FIC, each gate replacement candidate should pass the timing
check, otherwise ignored. As illustrated in Fig. 2(e), the
application of NB2-MO-HSC results in the selection of G8
and G3 as first two gates to be obfuscated.
The Algorithm 1 captures the detail implementation of
the proposed Lut-Lock obfuscation flow implementing the
NB2-MO-HSC policy. As mentioned previously, the overall
structures of MFO-HSC and MO-HSC are the same, and
since MO-HSC provides slightly more resilient behaviour
and also more possible candidates during each iteration, we
embed MO-HSC in the proposed LUT-Lock algorithm.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
For benchmarking the proposed LUT-Lock algorithm, we
used a farm of desktops equipped with Intel Core-i5 proces-
sor and 8GB of RAM. For a fair comparison, and to reduce
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 3: Gate conversion based on the application of De-Morgan’s law (a)
OR-AND (b) NOR-NOR (c) Custom1 (d) Custom2.
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Algorithm 1 LUT-Lock: Implementing NB2-MO-HSC for
LUT-based netlist obfuscation
1: α = β = 0.5; . α: TPS coeff, β: FIC size coeff;
2: γ = 0.1 . γ: feasible delay overhead
3: max delay thr = γ×CriticalPath;
4: MaxSize FIC = Max TPS = 0; . Total Positive Slack (TPS);
5: Forbidden output list = []
6: outputs list = find outputs(Circuit C);
7: for each (output in outputs list) do
8: if (output not in Forbidden output list) then
9: current FIC = BFS(output);
10: for all (paths in current FIC) do
11: Current TPS = TPS Calc(current FIC, paths);
12: Current Weight = α×Current TPS + β×sizeof(current FIC)
13: Max Weight = α×Max TPS + β×MaxSize FIC
14: if (Current Weight > Max Weight) then
15: candidate output = output;
16: MaxSize FIC = sizeof(BFS(candidate output));
17: Max TPS = Current TPS;
18: candidate list = Forbidden list = [];
19: candidate list.append(candidate output);
20: while (num of obfuscated < target no) do
21: if (candidate list == φ) then
22: Forbidden output list.append(candidate output)
23: go to line 5
24: else
25: current candidate = candidate list[0];
26: if (delay estimate(current candidate) < max delay thr) then
27: replace LUT(current candidate);
28: current candidate childlist = current candidate.child;
29: Forbidden list.append(current candidate childlist);
30: for each (current child in current candidate childlist) do
31: if (current child.child not in Forbidden list) then
32: candidate list.append(current child.child)
33: sort list(candidate list, min out impact);
34: for all (candidate list members with equal min out impact) do
35: sort list(candidate list, skew probability);
36: else
37: remove current candidate;
the impact of the operating system background processes,
we dedicated one machine to each SAT solver at a time,
and installed Ubuntu Server 16.04.3 LTS operating system
in shell mode. We used the largest ISCAS-85 benchmarks
(C2670, C3540, C5315, C6288, and C7552) to show the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. We employed the
Lingling-based SAT attack described and developed by [11].
We measured the SAT solver execution time by increasing
the number of obfuscated gates from 1 to 200. A run-time
limit of 1.1× 104 seconds was set for the SAT solver.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In order to show the effectiveness of each key feature
of the proposed algorithm, we compared the execution time
of SAT solver on circuits which are obfuscated based on
these sub-algorithms. We also compare the effectiveness of
the proposed LUT-Lock with that of previous work in STT-
LUT [22] and Reconfigurable barriers [23].
As illustrated in Fig. 5 the SAT solver’s execution time in-
creases as the replacement algorithm evolves from Random
replacement to FIC to HSC to MFO-HSC to MO-HSC to
Table I: Average Execution Time of SAT attack across studied benchmarks
obtained based on curve fitting, where x is the number of obfuscated gates.
Percentage RND FIC HSC MFO-HSC MO-HSC NB2-MO-HSC
1% 0.52784 2.3776 2.7616 2.632 1.9992 12.6224
2% 1.50576 14.1 16.6904 15.5616 16.5524 320.892
3% 2.9336 351.9444 122.232 2320.2128 2234.1712 2684.6368
5% 7.132 2246.175 2303.346 4509.764 4480.4504 8804.928
10% 17.4492 4768.544 6642.756 8802.2448 8803.548 time-out
Exp. 
Reg. 
(Ae
Bx
)
A = 0.2065
B = 0.8875
A = 38.769
B = 0.9961
A = 15.238
B = 1.217
A = 191.691
B = 0.7687
A = 182.622
B = 0.7783
A = 0.352
B = 3.518
RND FIC HSC MFO-HSC MO-HSC
NB2-MO-HSC
(LUT-Lock)
A = 0.2065
B = 0.8875
A = 38.769
B = 0.9961
A = 15.238
B = 1.217
A = 41.252
B = 1.316
A = 38.644
B = 1.339
A = 0.352
B = 3.518
Exponential 
Regression 
(Ae
Bx
)
MB2-MO-HSC, illustrating the orthogonal improvement of
added features in providing resiliency against SAT attacks.
The LUT-Lock algorithm, implementing the NB2-MO-HSC
replacement policy, combines all key features and provides
a close to exponential increase in the execution time of SAT
attack with respect to the number of obfuscated gates.
As illustrated in Fig. 5, the execution time of the SAT
solver, although increases steadily, faces small variation. The
variation in the execution time is the result of (1) random
nature of SAT solver in selecting DIPs from run-to-run, and
(2) rate of growth in the size of valid keys (as a result
of gate conversion using the application of De Morgan’s
laws, as explained in section IV-E), compared to the rate
of growth in the number of possible keys. A poor selection
of candidates for obfuscation results in a faster growth in
the number of valid keys, reducing the overall effectiveness
of obfuscated netlist against the SAT attack. As illustrated,
the LUT-Lock has the least variation, as it eliminates the
explosion of the set of valid keys by preventing back-to-
back gate obfuscation.
Table I captures the fitted function of execution time for
different sub-algorithms and LUT-Lock, where x denote the
number of obfuscated gates. As illustrated in this Table,
the LUT-Lock (NB2-MO-HSC) poses an exceptionally more
challenging SAT problem compare to other obfuscation
scheme. Table II compare the execution time of SAT attack,
across selected number of ISCAS 85 benchmarks, once
obfuscated by random LUT insertion and once using LUT-
Lock. As illustrated, execution time of SAT attack, grows
slowly as number of obfuscated cells increases in random
insertion policy, but it grows exponentially when LUT-Lock
policy is adopted.
Figure 5 visualizes the growth in the execution time of
SAT attack, for two of ISCAS-85 benchmarks obfuscated
using various LUT replacement policies. Other benchmarks
have similar behaviour and are omitted for lack of space. In
addition to replacement policies discussed in this paper, the
SAT resiliency of replacement policies in prior work, namely
STT-LUT [22] and Reconfigurable barriers [23] are captured
in this figure. From this figure, the SAT resiliency of prior
work is close to that of random replacement, showing slow
growth in SAT attack execution time with respect to the
number of inserted gates, where the Lot-Lock replacement
policy clearly shows a much faster exponential increase
in difficulty. As illustrated, in both benchmarks, with only
20 replaced LUTs, the LUT-Lock obfuscated netlist is as
resilient as the netlist produced by [22] and [23] replacement
policy when using 10X (200 gates) the number of gates.
And by increasing the number of gates, the SAT resiliency
of LUT-Lock insertion policy still grows exponentially.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed the LUT-Lock, a novel LUT-based ob-
fuscation algorithm, for building SAT resilient obfusca-
tion netlists, applicable to FPGA and ASIC designs. Our
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Figure 5: Execution time of the SAT solver from [11] for finding a valid
key when using LUT-Lock (NB2-MO-HSC) compared to its sub-algorithms
(RND, FIC, HSC, MO-HSC, and MFO-HSC) and the work in [22] and [23]
on ISCAS-85 (a) c5315, (b) c7552 benchmark.
Table II: Average Execution Time of SAT Solver across studied benchmarks
as a function of the percentage of obfuscated gates.
Circuits RND
c2670
c3540
c5315
c6288
c7552
1%
Lut-Lock RND
2%
RND
3%
RND
5%
RND
10%
0.18 0.876 0.5 1.388 0.93 1.924 2.41 24.64 3.48 time-out
0.6 1.244 1.07 6.12 2.25 988.2 2.66 time-out 5.29 time-out
0.5 9.052 1.21 115.012 1.66 941.02 3.93 time-out 12.04 time-out
0.57 23.508 2.14 1299.04 6.12 time-out 15.7 time-out 251.6 time-out
0.79 28.432 2.61 182.9 3.71 492.04 11.1 time-out 264.9 time-out
Lut-Lock Lut-Lock Lut-Lock Lut-Lock
simulation results illustrated that focusing the obfuscation
to impact the smallest number of primary output pins
increases the obfuscation difficulty. This was achieved by
means of selecting the fan-in of a minimum number of
primary outputs for obfuscation and selecting gates that
are connected to the smallest number of output pins. In
addition, we illustrated that gates with lower controllability
with respect to the primary inputs, as measured by signal
probability skew at their output pin, are better candidates
for obfuscation. Furthermore, we illustrated that avoiding
back-to-back LUT replacement considerably reduces the
number of valid key possibilities, increasing the resiliency
of the proposed algorithm against SAT attacks. Compared
to previous work, the LUT-Lock (NB2-MO-HSC) algorithm
provides exponentially better protection against SAT attacks.
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